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Introduction to Part One 
Sheila Carapico 
The end of the Cold War brought with it a temporary euphoria about 
prospects for a worldwide "third wave" of democratization to sweep the 
globe. If civil society had triumphed in the former Soviet bloc, perhaps 
political liberalism would spread elsewhere. No sooner had the sweet taste 
of victory over communism subsided, however, than Western observers 
turned their attention to another, allegedly uniquely, antidemocratic cur-
rent-Islam-whose civilizational values seem to clash with Western liber-
alism even more fundamentally than Marxism. Whereas people in other 
parts of the world crave civil society, so the argument goes, political open-
ings in the Muslim world have only fanned the flames of religious extrem-
ism. This argument finds much support in Orientalist literature, scholar-
ship, and journalism. 
Orientalist is here used in the sense established by the Palestinian-
American literary critic Edward W. Said's well-known book, Orientalism, to 
mean those who study, seek, and depict the Middle East. Said argued that 
Western literary treatment of the world of Islam and Arabs was based on an 
inversion of idealized images of European culture. He later expanded on 
this thesis to show how the American news media ''covers'' (a very deliberate 
pun) Islam and the question of Palestine.1 
Orientalism can also be found in the social sciences. For instance, Max 
Weber, an important European sociologist, used an inversion to define his 
ideal-typical concept of (European) legal-rationality, contrasting it with 
what he called "kadijustice," or the personalized application oflslamic law 
(shari'a). Weber tells his readers that" Muslim justice is the antonym of 
modern Western practice. 
In Orientalist depictions, Islam is often seen as the antithesis of tolerance, 
social justice, individualism, and legal-rationality. Jihad (often erroneously 
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understood solely as "holy war") appears more central to this great mono-
theistic religion than prayer or charity. It is frequently repeated that "there 
is no separation of religion and politics in Islam," again substituting the 
inversion of a Western ideal for understanding the complex relationship of 
Islamic law to religious practice and political regimes. 
The Orientalist mind-set attributes political struggles in the Middle East 
to culture, not social, economic, or individual factors. For instance, while 
lynchings, hate crimes, and family violence in America are but individual 
exceptions to a sound social ethic, "Islamic terrorism" is portrayed as if it 
were a religious expression. Most social scientists look to the humiliations 
of Versailles and the deprivations of the Great Depression to explain the 
"escape from freedom" into a violent, chauvinistic, exclusivist, right-wing 
European movement-fascism-in the 1930s. But how often do we look to 
military defeat and economic crisis to explain Middle Eastern extremism? 
Rarely, although these factors are clearly present. Instead (at least when 
comparing the West to the Orient), Westerners typically view Western 
experiences with slavery, fascism, and individual brutality as cultural anom-
alies in a tolerant, humane, egalitarian Judea-Christian civilization. Yet 
comparable phenomena in the Muslim world, widely "covered," appear to 
be indicators of a civilization that valorizes violence, book-burning, capital 
punishment, and chauvinism. Most of us do not believe right-wing Zionists 
or Christians who claim to speak for God, but we tend unquestioningly to 
accept that clenched-fisted Islamists waving green flags are the voice of the 
Muslim Allah. 
This view holds that cultural impediments to pluralist politics, peaceful 
expression of dissent, and the rights of citizens are greater in the Islamic 
world than almost anywhere else. Civil society, the sphere of autonomous 
civic groups and activities that protect the private sphere from the state, is 
critical for modern democracy. Islam, the argument goes, has no such civil 
society. 
The following essays help us to transcend the Orientalist myopia and then 
to look at Islamist2 political movements, in particular, on their own terms. 
Yahya Sadowski's thickly-argued critical analysis of "neo-Orientalism" at-
tempts to deconstruct scholarly arguments about the presumed nature of 
Islamic civilization. Two prominent Orientalist scholars derive central 
themes of traits they say characterize Arab culture today from their historical 
studies of one medieval Egyptian "slave" dynasty. Based on complex ex-
trapolations from this rather exceptional historical example, they argue that 
the modern Muslim world cannot develop civil society. 
The arguments Sadowski confronts are more subtle, nuanced, and so-
phisticated than a simple inversion. While a consensus reigns among the 
neo-Orientalists that the Middle East can never achieve the ideal of de-
mocracy, they differ about whether the obstacle is the state or society. 
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Sadowski notes that in the Middle East, as in Europe, major political move-
ments are not likely to be explained by enduring cultural ''essences.'' In the 
twentieth century North Africa and western Asia have seen nationalist, 
revolutionary, and Arab socialist movement:S, as well as sectarian violence; 
and important elements of the Muslim Brothers have opposed the use of 
violence. Some formerly Marxist or nationalist radicals are now radical 
Islamists. The politicization of a socially conservative, "fundamentalist" 
interpretation of the Qur'an into the most powerful current in the Middle 
East in the 1980s and 1990s must be explained in terms of its social, political, 
and economic context-not medieval history. 
What of the potential for civil society and democracy in Middle Eastern 
countries other than Israel, often unproblematically regarded as the lone 
Western-style democracy? Is Islam antithetical to democracy? Ifso, would we 
go so far as to say, ''Their culture is violent and antidemocratic, so that's okay 
for them"? Sarni Zubaida, Suad Joseph, Gudrun Kramer, and Alexander 
Flores each present something rare in English-insight into ongoing de-
bates among Muslim scholars, jurists, and political thinkers. 
What strikes many Western readers of these articles is the extent to 
which Muslims do explicitly confront, and differ on, constitutional issues 
of law, governance, and citizenship. Even though Islamists claim to be 
"authentic" representatives of the "true" Islam, there are debates among 
sc;holars and differences between countries and contexts. "The debate," as 
Kramer points out, "is how the shari'a (Islamic law) is to be defined-as 
a comprehensive set of norms and values regulating human life down to 
the minutest detail, or as a set of general rules of good life and moral 
behavior." 
This theme of defining the shari'a and its relationship to modern law and 
social policy, discussed on a theoretical level in this group of essays, carries 
over to the empirical case studies in the sections that follow. Zubaida and 
Flores guide readers through the transition from theory to on-the-ground 
issues. Zubaida shows that the contest in Egypt is not simply between re-
actionary Islamists and enlightened liberal democrats, but one that involves 
secular human rights activists and Islamists in a struggle with a government 
trying to contain them both. In this struggle, as Flores explains, the Egyptian 
regime initially encouraged the religious conservatives in order to combat 
the left; later, progressives found themselves in strategic political alliances 
with the Islamists against the government. These politics are dynamic and 
fluid. 
We do not have to accept right-wing zealots' claim to speak for all 
Muslims. Nor does understanding the Islamist current in its own terms and 
in a dynamic social, political, and economic context mean condoning either 
the totalizing aims or the violent methods of the religious right. All five of 
these essays are clear about this. Particularly moving is Joe Stork's interview 
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with Suadjoseph, an Arab woman who, like many Arab women, grapples 
with the multiple ways in which women's political space is constricted-by 
dehumanizing Orientalist stereotypes as well as by Middle Eastern patriar-
chal structures of class, community, and nation. Both imperialism and Arab 
politics limit her full citizenship and her exercise of basic rights. 
NOTES 
1. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978); The Question of 
Pal,estine (New York: Times Books, 1979); Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon, 
i 981). 
2. Note the distinction between Islamic and Muslim, which refer to the religion 
based on the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad; and Islamist, 
referring to the twentieth-century political movements claiming the Qur'an is their 
constitution. 
